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Abstract: Electricity distribution operators are regulated as monopolies around the 
world. Incentive regulation is further applied to relate their allowed revenues (rev-
enue cap) to cost efficiency and investment. Incentive regulation varies cross coun-
tries and has evolved over time for individual countries. Norway is one of the first 
countries reforming the network distributors by incentive regulation. Using the long 
time series data, we evaluated the impact of the Norwegian regulation regimes on 
firms’ investment. The panel data model includes common time-varying factors to 
control firm heterogeneity. The cross-section dependence test is further employed 
to test the relationship between investment and revenue cap in different regulation 
regimes. The empirical findings confirm a dynamic pattern of investment behavior 
between regimes, in terms of both the unobserved common factors and the cross-
section dependence between investment and revenue cap. This study provides an 
interesting solution for incentive evaluation and contributes to the management 
accounting literature in terms of econometric techniques.
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1. Introduction
As Chirinko (1993) stated, the fundamental problems of fixed investment research are the consist-
ency of theoretical models and the interpretation of econometric evidence using non-experimental 
data with limited and noisy variation. According to Jorgenson’s neoclassical model (Jorgenson, 
1971), profit-maximizing firms’ investment behavior depend on whether the sum of the expected 
returns is higher than the incurred cost of capital. However, firms may choose capital stock, other 
inputs, and production levels simultaneously. This makes it difficult to isolate the individual impacts 
of determinants on investment decisions. Based on an imperfect market, the theoretical framework 
and econometric approaches of investment analysis become either simpler or more complicated. In 
this study, we explore the relationship between investment decisions and revenue caps under vari-
ous incentive regulations, with a case study of Norwegian electricity distribution networks.
Electricity distribution networks around the world are regulated as natural monopolies in order to 
avoid overinvestment in the same regions. At the same time, incentive regulation of natural monopo-
lies has been implemented to prevent a decline in capital equipment costs in a situation of rapid 
technological change (Biglaiser & Riordan, 2000). Current regulatory incentives of electricity distribu-
tion networks generally use revenue caps as a tool to spur sufficient investment to modernize the grid. 
The total revenue of each electricity distribution company is constrained by the maximal revenue, 
which is set by the regulators. The calculation of the revenue cap is based on the company’s previous 
capital costs and other inputs, efficiency scores, and geographic features. This means that the direc-
tion of causality may be from revenue cap to investment. In the long run, increased capital input leads 
to technical progress and high distribution efficiency, which in turn guarantees sufficient payoffs.
Norway has implemented a power sector reform since the early 1990s, the second country in 
Europe to do so after the UK (Poudineh & Jamasb, 2016a). The long data period can help us compare 
the efficacy of incentives under different regulation regimes by testing structural changes in the in-
vestment behavior of network companies. The potential structural changes in investment behavior 
may be attributed to the observed driving forces like regulation regimes and other unobserved het-
erogeneity between firms. The advanced statistical techniques of panel models are applied to ex-
plore the dynamics of investment decisions. This is further related to the evaluation of various 
regulatory incentives.
Panel models are a powerful tool in the econometric analysis of investment decisions, which are 
hugely heterogeneous across firms. A panel model can eliminate heterogeneity bias and its ex-
planatory power generally exceeds that of cross-sectional models. Henderson and Kaplan (2000) 
compared different modeling techniques when evaluating the determinants of audit report lags in 
the bank industry. They found that the cross-sectional estimate was subject to omitted-variable bias 
and that the panel model with firm-specific intercepts provided consistent estimates. Nunes, 
Serrasqueiro, and Sequeira (2009) used a static panel model and dynamic estimator to investigate 
the determinants of the profitability of Portuguese service industries. Few studies have applied panel 
models to explore investment decisions under regulatory incentives, although, researchers have ap-
plied other econometric methods to evaluate investment decisions under incentive-based regimes, 
in the context of Norway (Poudineh & Jamasb, 2016a, 2016b) and other countries (Cambini, 
Fumagalli, & Rondi, 2016; Cullmann & Nieswand, 2016; Kinnunen, 2006). Poudineh and Jamasb 
(2016b) used Baysian techniques to assess the impact on investment behavior of various driving 
forces, i.e. demand factors, characteristics of distribution networks, and quality-driven factors. 
Unlike Poudineh and Jamasb (2016b), we directly test how the regulatory incentives affect firms’ 
investment behavior. Regulatory incentives are based on efficiency measures and hence account for 
the various driving forces behind investment behavior. Consequently, the revenue cap can be treat-
ed as a compound of variables, i.e. the drive forces behind investment decisions. Simple modeling 
techniques of management accounting are more cost-effective than their complex counterparts 
(Macintosh & Scapens, 1991; Scapens, 1994).
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Most of cited studies on electricity distribution networks have restricted themselves to evaluating 
methods of calculating efficiency measures and to providing suggestions about how to improve 
these methods. Researchers have provided ex ante evidence regarding the design of incentive regu-
lations, especially frontier-based efficiency measures. However, distribution companies are expect-
ed to respond to actual incentives rather than any other ex-ante simulated results. Thus, the ex post 
evidence of the impact of the actual incentive regulations on investment is worthy of researchers’ 
attention.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss relevant literature on investment deci-
sions under incentive regulations. We then present background information for the present study, 
i.e. the historical context of Norwegian electricity distributors. In Section 4, the data and methodol-
ogy are described, followed by a discussion of the empirical findings in Section 5. Finally, we con-
clude with a summary and potential policy implications.
2. Literature review
In the spirit of Jorgenson (1971) and his numerous collaborators, management accounting models 
have been derived by researchers to evaluate discounted flow of profits, delivery lags, and other 
adjustment costs. Return on investment or cash flows are then calculated to compare with accrued 
cost. These traditional models were later modified to reflect value-based management and strategic 
management accounting (Seal, 2010). For firms under government regulation, Averch and Johnson 
(1962, p. 1052) defined the “fair rate of return” criterion as: “… After the firm subtracts its operating 
expenses from gross revenues, the remaining net revenues should be just sufficient to compensate 
the firm for its investment in plant and equipment.” The revenue cap, as a useful regulatory tool, is 
directly consistent with this criterion and is broadly applied to improve the investment incentives of 
regulated firms.
Incentive designs can be made by either shareholders or regulators. For internal incentive designs, 
Ortner, Velthuis, and Wollscheid (2017) theoretically illustrated how to design incentive systems to 
ensure multi-period investment decisions under unknown preferences in risky situations. For firms 
where earning management is determined by external agents, the internal investment decisions are 
still affected by the management (McNichols & Stubben, 2008).
As documented by Wagenhofer (2003), considering accruals relative to cash flow for performance 
measurement was useful, even if an agent could manipulate depreciation methods. Investment 
decisions play a role in the design of incentive regulations through annual depreciation, depending 
on the regulation intervals. For the energy distribution industry, the depreciation and maintenance 
fees from the last years are used to calculate the efficiency scores and the allowed revenues in later 
periods. This implies that revenue cap, which is mainly based on costs incurred in the last periods, 
should lead to capital expenditures. Biglaiser and Riordan (2000) highlighted that, for an industry 
with an incentive regulation, the incentives for replacement investments may increase if the new 
equipment improves production techniques.
The increasing importance of distribution network investment is mostly due to the requirement of 
having to improve efficiency and achieve carbon-free generation. This draws researchers’ attention 
to evaluating the determinants of investment decisions under incentive regulations. For example, 
Cullmann and Nieswand (2016) derived an investment model including micro- and macro-variables 
to explore investment behavior of German electricity distributors before and after incentive regula-
tion. They confirmed that the implementation of incentive regulation had a significantly positive 
impact on distributors’ investment rates. Although firm-specific factors were incorporated in their 
model specification to control for firm heterogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity was ignored. 
Poudineh and Jamasb (2016b) applied investment models with variables based on economic theory, 
Norwegian regulatory models, and technical grid characteristics. Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) 
techniques were applied to evaluate these variables’ contributions to the model’s explanatory 
 power. Although Poudineh and Jamasb (2016b) provided detailed evidence for determinants of 
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investment decisions, there is no evidence of the direct relationship between investments and regu-
latory incentives. Moreover, exactly how the various Norwegian regulatory models affect distribu-
tors’ investment was not specified.
3. Norwegian incentive regulations
Since the 1990s, power sector reforms have been implemented throughout European counties, in-
cluding Norway (Poudineh & Jamasb, 2016a). The electricity distribution industry, as a national mo-
nopoly, is regulated by incentives to encourage new investments and to protect consumers from 
market power. For distribution operators, investment decisions depend on market mechanisms, in-
stitutional constraints, and firms’ characteristics. Of these, institutional constraints became a domi-
nant driving force as the traditional rate-of-return regulation was replaced with various incentive 
regulations (Cullmann & Nieswand, 2016).
From 1993 to 1996, Norway used a traditional rate-of-return regulation and set the price to cost 
of distribution. As argued in the literature, this traditional regulation may have led to a lack of incen-
tives for cost efficiency (Poudineh & Jamasb, 2016a). Since then, a more effective incentive-based 
regulation, the revenue cap (RC) regulation, has been implemented in Norway. Generally speaking, 
for a company operating, all cost variables incurred are aggregated to a single index, which is then 
benchmarked against peers in order to calculate efficiency scores (Miguéis, Camanho, Bjørndal, & 
Bjørndal, 2012; Poudineh & Jamasb, 2016b). The efficiency scores are further used to derive a norm 
cost. The allowed revenue for each distributor is calculated through a combination of actual and 
norm costs.
The Norwegian revenue cap regulation has evolved over time. It can be separated into three dis-
tinct versions: 1997–2001; 2002–2006; and 2007-onwards. Below, we introduce the latest version of 
the incentive scheme. We then summarize the differences between the current and previous 
schemes, with particular attention paid to regulation schemes’ impacts on investment decisions.
The 2007-onwards version of Norwegian incentive regulations takes the form:
 
where RCt is revenue cap of the network companies; Ct represents inflation-adjusted actual cost; C
∗
t
is the normalized cost based on the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model; λ is the weight set 
between the actual cost and the norm cost. Currently, the regulator set λ equals 60%. Both the infla-
tion-adjusted actual cost and the normalized cost are based on historic data year before last. For λ, 
a higher value means a more important influence of norm cost on allowed revenue.
The 2002–2006 incentive regulation applied the costs for the 1996–1999 period to estimate net-
works’ operation scores and then compute the norm cost (C∗t ). The period for the base cost was 
1994–1995 for the incentive regulation in 1997–2001. Unlike the current version, the two previous 
incentive regulations fixed the period for the base cost. Moreover, they applied a longer period than 
the new version when calculating the norm cost. Both the fixed intervals of revenue caps and the 
base years chosen play a substantial role in investment decisions and timing (Cullmann & Nieswand, 
2016). When the fixed period for the cost base is applied, the regulated companies invested imme-
diately after the regulatory review in order to maximize excess profit in the regulatory period 
(Sweeney, 1981). In addition to bases, the three regimes differ from each other in terms of the meth-
ods used to include the realized cost of current or adjacent years in the revenue caps. As one can see 
from Equation (1), the new incentive regulation directly incorporates the realized cost to calculate 
the revenue cap and uses a weight to adjust the relative importance of the realized cost (and the 
norm cost). The 2002–2006 regime took the depreciation that occurred in the last year as one of the 
elements in the formulations. In the RC formula used in 1997–2001, the change in energy distributed 
in the current year and last year was included in the model to reflect recent cost changes.
(1)RCt = (1 − )Ct + C
∗
t
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Above all, there are substantial differences between the three Norwegian regulation schemes 
used in 1997–2001, 2002–2006, and 2007-onwards. These differences may cause structural chang-
es in the impact of revenue caps on investment decisions.
4. Data description and methodology
4.1. Data description
Accounting data from the electricity distribution networks are provided by the Norwegian Water 
Resource and Energy Directorate (https://www.nve.no/). The sample period is from 1997 to 2012. 
The original data-set is an unbalanced panel as a number of small distribution operators exited from 
the market, as a result of mergers and acquisitions among the network companies. A reduction in 
the number of operators may lead to changes in scale economy and affects the relationship be-
tween investment and revenue cap. Accordingly, in this study we use a balanced panel data-set by 
selecting samples that have existed through the entire period. This can facilitate relating the poten-
tial structural changes in investment behavior to firms’ behavior rather than capacity changes after 
mergers.
For the model with total investment and revenue cap, the balanced panel data-set is composed of 
89 distribution operators, all of which are observed in all 16 years. As of 2002, operators are required 
to report new investment and reinvestment. Thus, the model with new investment and reinvest-
ment uses the balanced panel data-set from 2002 to 2012, a total of 11 years and 89 operators. 
Data description for revenue cap, investment, and depreciation is reported in Table 1.
Table 1 indicates that the average revenue cap increases by 27.5% in 2002–2006 and 51.9% in 
2007–2012, relative to the base period 1997–2001. The corresponding growths of total investments 
Table 1. Data summary
Note: Unit: 1000 Norwegian kroner.
Year Revenue cap 
(RC)
Investment (IN) Reinvestment Depreciation
Total New 
investment
1997 3,968,382 808,977 553,411
1998 4,376,344 928,209 620,042
1999 4,714,314 721,107 654,640
2000 4,610,708 782,992 684,324
2001 5,102,221 646,662 698,172
1997–2001 4,554,394 777,589 642,118
2002 5,497,387 957,121 728,851 228,270 728,663
2003 5,889,131 795,656 615,149 180,507 746,498
2004 5,785,126 905,662 618,054 287,608 773,961
2005 5,734,775 1,166,573 881,494 285,079 796,439
2006 6,123,949 833,626 651,902 181,724 835,936
2002–2006 5,806,074 931,728 699,090 232,638 776,299
2007 5,915,091 990,946 703,178 287,768 860,632
2008 6,116,288 1,069,608 704,781 364,827 890,621
2009 6,231,084 1,153,786 719,181 434,605 925,704
2010 8,136,988 1,188,438 788,120 400,318 958,907
2011 7,844,918 1,484,051 866,774 617,277 1,074,185
2012 7,256,583 1,864,003 1,173,524 690,479 1,109,999
2007–2012 6,916,825 1,291,805 825,926 465,879 970,008
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are 19.9 and 66.1%, respectively. The share of investment out of revenue cap is 17.1% in 1997–2001, 
16.0% in 2002–2006, and 18.7% in 2007–2012. The high growth of investment in 2007–2012 and its 
large share out of revenue cap imply that the current incentive method has successfully stimulated 
the distribution networks to increase capital inputs. However, the share of depreciation value out of 
revenue cap only increases 0.6% between 2002–2006 (13.4%) and 2007–2012 (14.0%), although the 
share of total investment out of revenue cap increases 1.7% (= 18.7 − 16.0%). This may be related to 
the composition of total investments. For the two recent sub-periods, the share of reinvestment out 
of revenue cap increases from 4.01% in 2002–2006 to 6.74% in 2007–2012; however, the share of 
new investment out of revenue cap decreases from 12.0 to 11.9%.
4.2. The panel data model
In panel data, individuals (network companies, in our case) are observed at several time-interval 
points. When estimating panel data models, a main issue is unobserved heterogeneity in the dimen-
sions of time, individual, or both. Econometricians use dummy variables or structural assumptions 
on the error terms to control for unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed constant over time. If 
the unobserved heterogeneity is not constant, the effect of the observed variables is not consistently 
estimated. For our case study, the unobserved heterogeneity may change with the updated regula-
tory methods. Following Bai (2004) and Bai, Kao, and Ng (2009), we apply the method of principal 
components to catch unobserved individual effects. Thus, the classic panel data model is modified 
by adding a principal estimator (E)
 
where IN is annual investment and RC is annual revenue cap; α is constant; δi controls individual ef-
fect; τt controls the time-specific effect, which affects all individuals in the same way; β is the pa-
rameter catching the impact of RC on IN; E represents the time-varying individual effect, a n × 1 
vector of latent factors of investments; U is the idiosyncratic error term.
Bai (2004) defines the specification of common time-varying factors as follows:
 
where γ denotes the individual factor-loading parameters and F represents unobserved common 
factors. After confirming the existence of common factors, the factor-loading parameters can be 
plotted in the dimension of time to reveal how the loading parameters evolve over time.
4.3. The cross-section dependence test
The existence of common factors indicates that individuals respond to certain common shocks, 
leading to serial correlation between individuals. Among the different tests of cross-section (CD) 
dependence, the one proposed by Pesaran (2004) is employed here to directly evaluate the correla-
tion between the RC and IN panels. This CD test is valid under fairly general variety settings even with 
a short time period and large number of individuals, the data type closest to our data-set.
The CD test of Pesaran (2004) is expressed as:
 
where T and N are numbers of observations and sample size; ?̂?ij represents pair-wise correlation coef-
ficients for each pair of cross-sectional units. The null hypothesis is no cross-sectional dependence 
against cross-sectional dependence. The CD test statistic is a nominal distribution as either time or 
individual dimension tends to infinity in any order (Pesaran, 2004).




















Page 7 of 11
Zhang & Xie, Cogent Economics & Finance (2017), 5: 1400900
https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2017.1400900
5. Results and discussion
5.1. The panel data model
Equation (2) is a full representation of the panel model, with both individual and time effects. In ad-
dition to Equation (2), we also estimate various specific versions of the panel model, i.e. the model 
with individual effect, the model with time effect, and the base model without the two effects. Each 
model is accompanied by common time-varying factors, Equation (3). This “general-to-specific” 
specification search approach can reveal how model specification affects the impact of revenue cap 
on investment behavior. In other words, we test whether relationships between the two variables 
are affected by time effect and/or individual effect in the panel model. Most of the time series are 
stationary and, accordingly, the level variables are used in the model. An iterated least-squared ap-
proach is used to estimate the panel models. The estimation results are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that the R2 values for the four models range from 0.917 to 0.934, indicating a re-
markable goodness-of-fit. Moreover, the coefficient of RC is firmly significant in the four models. 
Thus, excluding fixed-time effect and/or individual effect from the panel model does not affect the 
explanatory power of the regressor, RC. However, the estimated coefficient of RC does vary. For the 
full representation of the panel model, the coefficient of RC is 0.0598, which is not substantially dif-
ferent from the estimate of the model with individual effect (0.0648). In contrast, estimates from 
the two models above are substantially different from estimates from the model with time effect 
(0.133) and the model without individual and time effects (0.149). One empirical issue is whether the 
different estimates of RC signal different dimensions of the common time-varying factors estimated 
from the four models. As shown in Table 2, the existence of four common factors is consistently sup-
ported by the four models. Conclusively, while the revenue cap can explain most investment chang-
es, as evidenced by the high R2 values, there are many unobserved common factors that contribute 
to investment decisions. For example, geographic feature and quality of distribution may affect both 
investment decisions and responses of networks operators to regulatory incentives. This is also ob-
served in other European countries (Cambini et al., 2016).
Before using the common factors to detect structural changes in investment behavior, we calcu-
late the share of individual loading parameters’ variances out of the total variance. The results are 
reported in the lower part of Table 2. Among the four time-varying common factors of investment, 
the first vector is the dominant one, as its share of the total variance is over 40% in all four models. 
Accordingly, we illustrate the first common factor estimated from the four models in Figure 1.
Table 2. Estimated coefficients and common factors of the panel model
Note: Values in square bracket are standard error.






Model 3 (Time 
effect)
Model 4 (Base)
Constant 7,520* [167] 7,200* [184] 2,760* [222] 1,700* [217]
Revenue cap (RC) 0.0598* [0.0126] 0.0648* [0.0116] 0.133* [0.0045] 0.149* [0.0036]
Number of factors 4 4 4 4
Share out of total variance
Factor 1 40.75 40.09 42.00 40.22
Factor 2 25.69 26.15 26.14 26.1
Factor 3 18.75 18.82 17.03 18.51
Factor 4 14.81 14.94 14.83 15.18
R2 value 0.93 0.933 0.921 0.917
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The two vertical lines in Figure 1 separate the curves into three regulatory incentive schemes, i.e. 
1997–2001, 2002–2006, and 2007–2012. We see in Figure 1 that the four lines increasingly converge 
toward each other. At the last time points, the estimated common factors are almost the same. The 
pattern of these four lines interpreted as a whole reflects a high level of fluctuations through the 
sample period. The differences between the three regimes are clearly evidenced by the figure. While 
firms mainly respond negatively to the common factors in the second regime, their responses are 
both negative and positive in the first regime and are constantly positive in the current regime. The 
first two sub-periods have a more dynamic pattern than the current period where the common fac-
tors are stable in the first several time points before then showing a steep upward trend. The re-
vealed structural changes of the unobserved factors may imply the indirect impact on distributors’ 
investment behaviors of changes in incentive regulation, via other unobserved factors, like useful life 
of assets and cost of network energy loss (Poudineh & Jamas, 2016b).
In sum, the unobserved time-varying common factors estimated from the panel models provide 
evidence of structure changes in the three incentive regimes. This is likely in accordance with chang-
es in incentive regulations and is attributed to factors, which may reflect indirect effects of revenue 
cap.
5.2. The cross-section dependence (CD) test
Since revenue cap explains most investment changes, as revealed in the panel models, the test of 
structural changes in the relationship between investment and revenue cap is more relevant to in-
vestment analysis. The CD test is applied to the entire sample as well as the three incentive regimes. 
The available data for new investments and reinvestments are employed to test their correlations 
Figure 1. The estimated first 
time-varying common factors 
of the four panel models.
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with revenue caps in 2002–2006 and 2007–2012. Between these two periods, while new investment 
increased by only 18.1%, reinvestment doubled (Table 1). The correlation between the total invest-
ment and revenue cap is probably different from the correlation between its components and reve-
nue cap. The CD test results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that, for all pair-wise variables, the null hypothesis of zero cross dependence is 
firmly rejected at the 0.01% significance level. The results for total investment vs. revenue cap are in 
line with the estimated significant impact of RC on IN in the panel models. Following Pesaran (2004), 
the test statistic can be used to justify the closeness between the pair-wise variables. For the total 
investment vs. revenue cap pair, the statistic value of the CD test using the entire sample is as high 
as 52.3, which is greater than the test values in the three sub-periods. The upward trend of the test 
value is observed from early to later periods. The results reflect a closer link between investment and 
revenue cap in 2007–2012 than in the two previous sub-periods. Thus, the current regulatory incen-
tive has a stronger influence on investment incentives than the old regulations. As the new regime 
do not fix the period for the normalized cost and directly incorporate the realized cost in the revenue 
cap, those changes may lead to an increase in the total investment.
Is this conclusion supported by the test results using the components of the total investment? The 
statistic value of the CD test for the new investment and revenue cap pair is 66.0 in 2002–2006 and 
18.5 in 2007–2012. The lower value in the latter period implies a looser relationship between new 
investment and revenue cap in 2007–2012. This contrasts with findings for reinvestment. For the 
relationship between reinvestment and revenue cap, the high statistic value in 2007–2012 (56.7) 
compared with the one in 2002–2006 (36.5) indicates a strengthened link between these two vari-
ables. If new equipment leads to larger technical progress than reinvestment, the current regulation 
might not fully improve the distribution efficiency of network companies. Using different modeling 
techniques, empirical findings in Poudineh and Jamas (2016b) show that some regutory incentives 
of Norwegian regulatory models appeared to have been ineffetive.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we explored investment behavior of Norwegian electricity distribution companies, us-
ing panel data econometric techniques. The distribution companies are regulated as natural mo-
nopolies in Norway and elsewhere in order to avoid overinvestment in the same regions. At the same 
time, regulatory incentives are implemented to encourage network companies to increase invest-
ments, and to protect consumers from market power. This becomes more important as the electric-
ity sector is targeted as a decarbonized industry. Differing from a perfect market where firms 
maximize discounted cash flow and justify expected returns that are higher than incurred costs, in-
vestment behavior in an imperfect market is probably associated with regulation incentive rather 
than those seen under a perfect market.
Table 3. The cross-section dependence (CD) test results
Whole sample 1997–2001 2002–2006 2007–2012
Total investment vs. Revenue cap
statistic value 52.3 26.1 31.4 38.4
p-value < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
New investment vs. Revenue cap
statistic value 38.0 66.0 18.5
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Reinvestment vs. Revenue cap
statistic value 41.7 36.5 56.7
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Critical value 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.56
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Under the regulatory incentive, firm efficiency is benchmarked against peer efficiency, which may 
lead to a reward or penalty. The regulatory revenue cap is expected to encourage network compa-
nies to improve distribution efficiency through capital input. The heterogeneity of distribution opera-
tors and the various measures of distribution efficiency indicate a complex relationship between 
investment and revenue cap. The potential structural changes of investments in various regulation 
regimes can be attributed to either firms’ heterogeneity or changes in methods used to calculate 
revenue cap.
The relationship between investment and revenue cap for Norwegian distribution operators is first 
evaluated using panel data models. In these models, the accompanied time-varying common fac-
tors are used to test heterogeneity of distribution companies after controlling for the influences of 
revenue cap. The results show a significant impact of revenue cap on investment decision. Moreover, 
revenue cap explains most investment changes, although the existence of four common time-vary-
ing factors is verified regardless of whether individual effect and/or time effect are incorporated into 
the panel model. The unobserved common factors provide evidence of structural changes in invest-
ment, which coincides with the three regulation regimes and may reflect the indirect impact of regu-
lation changes on firms’ investment behaviors.
The cross-section dependence test results reveal a strengthened link between investment and 
revenue cap over time, implying that the current regulatory incentive is more effective in driving in-
vestment than the previous versions. The previous two regimes applied a fixed period for calculation 
of the normalized cost. Operators may invest immediately after the regulatory review in order to 
maximize economic benefit. Unlike the previous two regimes, the current regime does not use a 
fixed period for calculation of the normalized cost. This may lead to a gradual investment under the 
regime. However, for the components of total investment, the cross-section dependence test only 
confirms a closer relationship between reinvestment and revenue cap in the latest period compared 
to the last period. For the new investment and revenue cap pair, the test reflects a looser relation-
ship in the current regime. These results are in line with changes in depreciation. Between the last 
two periods with different incentive frameworks, changes in the share of depreciation value out of 
revenue cap is negligible.
Researchers on incentive regulation focus primarily on the measurements of productivity, which 
are probably reflected in the evolvement of the revenue cap regulation in Norway and other coun-
tries. The investment timing and the choices between new investment and reinvestment are af-
fected by the regulation and directly affect distribution efficiency. Investment behavior under the 
current regime is totally different from the previous regimes. This may relate to a flexible period for 
the base cost and incorporation of the realized cost in the revenue cap under the current regime. 
However, the new investment has less been spurred. As new investment generally leads a great 
depreciation. Regulators may consider to set a high weight for depreciation when calculating the 
realized cost.
This study contributes, first, to management accounting techniques. Traditional econometric 
practices focus on the estimation of the driving forces behind firms’ investment behavior at the aver-
age level. Heterogeneity due to firm size, location, production level, and life time probably leads to 
non-classical measurement errors and/or misspecification in the model. Firm heterogeneity is ex-
plicitly accounted for in the panel models that incorporate individual effect, time effect, and com-
mon time-varying factors. Estimation results can further reveal the dynamic pattern of investment 
behavior. The informative results are subsequently useful for evaluating the incentive regimes of the 
network companies. Incentive effectiveness in driving distribution operators’ investments (and 
hence their carbon performance) is a critical criterion when evaluating regulatory incentives. Our 
methods can be applied to other individual cases and to cross-country analysis regarding the incen-
tive frameworks of electricity network industries.
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